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Abstract 
 
Spinnewijn (2013) posits that optimism about risk and the efficacy of risk-reducing effort 
could cause selection in insurance markets.  We test for this using a survey of 474 
subjects’ demand for hypothetical cancer insurance.  We elicit perceptions of baseline 
cancer risk and control efficacy and combine these with subject-specific cancer risks 
predicted by the Harvard Cancer Risk Index to develop measures of baseline and control 
optimism.  We find that only 23 percent of our subjects would purchase a fair insurance 
contract aligned to their true risk type.  Of these subjects, 94 percent also overinvest in 
prevention, leading to advantageous selection.   
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I.  Overview 
 
Economists have long posited that asymmetric information with heterogeneous risk 
types can lead to adverse selection in insurance markets (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976).  
Individuals with private information that they are high-risk types tend to buy more 
coverage than low-risk types.  High-risk types will also have higher claims, leading to a 
positive correlation between insurance coverage and claims.  Such positive correlations 
have been found in some markets, but rejected in others.  For example, Puelz and Snow 
(1994) find evidence of adverse selection in the market for automobile insurance, but 
Chiappori and Salanie (2000) do not.  By contrast, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) reject 
the hypothesis of adverse selection in their study of long-term care insurance.  
 
These mixed findings concerning adverse and advantageous selection have led 
researchers to look for other sources of private information and selection in insurance 
markets.  De Meza and Webb (2001) develop a model where risk aversion leads to 
advantageous selection as more risk-averse subjects buy more insurance and 
simultaneously engage in more prevention behavior leading to a negative correlation 
between coverage and claims.  Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008) examine the market 
for Medi-gap insurance (a supplement to Medicare).  They found that when cognitive 
ability is controlled for, a negative correlation between coverage and ex-post claims is 
found, indicative of advantageous selection.  They conclude that the correlation arises 
2 
 
because cognitive ability is correlated with both good health and the purchase of health 
insurance.  
 
A recent paper by Spinnewijn (2013) posits that heterogeneity in risk misperceptions 
may also affect the relationships between coverage and claims, leading either to 
advantageous or adverse selection.  Spinnewijn (2013) recognizes two dimensions of 
risk misperception.  First, subjects may be relatively “baseline optimistic,” meaning they 
believe their risk of damages is lower than it actually is.  Baseline optimistic subjects are 
theorized to demand less insurance than their more pessimistic counterparts.  “Control 
optimists” overestimate the risk reductions arising from engaging in preventative 
activities and avoiding risky activities. As a result, they overinvest in risk-reducing 
activities relative to their true risk type, leading to lower expected insurance claims. 
Assuming a simple model with two insures with different perceived risk types and 
incentive-compatible equilibrium contracts, Spinnewijn (2013) shows that if one insuree 
is more baseline and control optimistic than the other, a positive correlation between 
coverage and claims will occur.  A negative correlation results if the more control 
pessimistic type is also relatively more baseline optimistic.  Thus, depending on the 
correlation between the control and baseline optimism of the two insurees, either 
adverse or advantageous selection may result.     
 
Using an online survey of 478 US adults aged 18 and older, we investigate the effects of 
risk misperception on the willingness to pay for a hypothetical cancer insurance policy 
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and future expected cancer insurance claims, controlling for risk preferences, cognitive 
ability, and potentially important demographic variables.  We choose cancer insurance 
because much is known about the role demographics and behavioral choices play in 
forming cancer risks.  We elicit baseline risk perceptions, perceptions of the efficacy of 
prevention efforts and risk factors related to colon, prostate, and bladder cancer for 
men and colon, bladder and breast cancer for women.  We query subjects about their 
behaviors that may either reduce or increase risks for one or more of these cancers.  We 
elicit estimates of the subject’s degree of risk aversion using the Holt and Laury’s (2002) 
multiple price-list elicitation method.  We measure cognitive ability using a short 
intelligence assessment.   
 
To our knowledge, no other research has empirically evaluated the role of risk 
misperceptions in selection in insurance markets.  This is likely because there are few 
insurable events for which data are available on actual and perceived risk.  Thus, the 
strength of this study is that our measures of cancer-risk misperception rest on applying 
subjects’ survey responses to the Harvard Cancer Risk Index (HCRI) (Colditz et al. 2000).  
The HCRI was developed at the Harvard Center for Cancer Prevention, by a working 
group of “epidemiologists, clinical oncologists, and other Harvard faculty with 
quantitative expertise focused on cancer and risk assessment” (Ibid.).  The HCRI 
provides quantitative relative risk (RR) factors for each demographic or health 
behavioral attribute that experts believe bear on the risk of incidence of a given cancer.  
The HCRI can thus be used to calculate the risk a subject will contract cancer, 
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conditional on a set of behavioral and demographic traits.  By asking subjects to 
estimate their risk of incidence of each cancer, and comparing that with the HCRI 
estimates, we derive a measure of their baseline optimism.  Similarly, by asking subjects 
how effective a series of preventative measures are in reducing cancer risk, and how 
risky a series of unhealthy behaviors are, and then comparing them with the 
corresponding HCRI RR factors, we derive a measure of their control optimism. 
 
Standard tests for advantageous or adverse selection rest on the sign of the correlation 
between insurance coverage and claims: positive correlation suggests adverse selection, 
whereas negative correlation implies advantageous selection.  The hypothetical nature 
of the survey reported in the current paper necessitates a different approach to testing 
for selection.  We first test whether baseline and control optimism influence prevention 
effort, and thereby affect the risk of contracting cancer.  Next, we test whether baseline 
optimism causes people to under-insure relative to their true risk type.  In both models 
we control for other factors, such as cognitive ability risk aversion, and demographic 
variables which may influence willingness to pay for insurance and prevention effort.  
This approach allows us to classify subjects according to whether their willingness to pay 
for insurance and prevention efforts are high or low relative to their true risk type and 
health preferences while controlling for other factors that may lead to selection.  Given 
these classifications, we can infer whether positive or negative correlation between 
coverage and claims will be present in our sample. 
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Our findings offer strong support for Spinnewijn’s (2013) hypothesis that risk 
misperception can lead to selection in insurance markets.  We find that male subjects 
who underestimate their likelihood of cancer incidence (baseline optimists) are willing 
to pay less for full insurance, ceteris paribus.  The effect is not present for female 
subjects.  We also show control optimists of both genders engage in more prevention 
and fewer risky health behaviors, indicating that, on average, their cancer risks and 
insurance claims will be lower.  At the same time, baseline optimism leads subjects to 
engage in less preventative effort, thereby raising their cancer risk and associated 
expected claims.  
 
Our classification model indicates that optimism causes over 76 percent of our sample 
to reject an actuarially fair insurance contract.  Of the remaining subjects, 23 percent 
accept the contract and simultaneously engage in excess prevention; the final 2 percent 
accept the contract but under-invest in prevention.  Thus we show that controlling for 
risk aversion and cognitive ability, optimism drives most high-risk types out of the 
market, leading to advantageous selection. 
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II.  Literature Review 
 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) introduced the theory of adverse selection, hypothesizing 
that even small amounts of asymmetric information in competitive markets can lead to 
significant distortions of market-clearing prices and quantities.  They focused their study 
on the market for insurance, where they posited that when insurees of heterogeneous 
risk types have private information about their level of risk, adverse selection may 
result.  Individuals who know they are high-risk types tend to buy more coverage than 
low-risk types.  High risk-types will also have higher claims, leading to a positive 
correlation between insurance coverage and claims.  With the resulting downward-
sloping marginal cost curve, the average cost curve is at all times above the marginal 
cost curve, leading at best to an under-provision of insurance to those with the lowest 
levels of risk.  Depending on the risk premiums individuals place on insurance, a 
complete unraveling of an insurance offering is possible (see Einav and Finkelstein 
(2011) for a more detailed discussion). 
 
The seminal paper by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) spurred a robust theoretical and 
empirical literature.  Much of the empirical work involved estimating correlations 
between the amount of insurance coverage and ex-post expenditures on claims 
predicted by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).  A positive correlation suggests adverse 
selection, whereas a negative correlations points to advantageous selection.  For 
example, Chiappori and Salanie (2000) analyzed data from automobile insurance 
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contracts for young French drivers and found that, when observables are adequately 
taken into account, no evidence of asymmetric information remains.  They concluded 
that this may be because young drivers do not know their risk types, and older drivers 
do not know more about their risk types than do the insurance companies.  However, 
Cohen (2005) performed a similar examination of automobile insurance data and found 
a significant positive correlation between coverage and claims for more experienced 
drivers, suggesting these more experienced drivers may have learned about their own 
risk types to a greater extent than had their insurers and less experienced drivers, 
leading to information asymmetries that result in adverse selection. 
 
De Meza and Webb (2001) noted several previous studies that found either a lack of 
evidence of adverse selection, or even a negative correlation between coverage and 
claims.  They proposed a model in which an additional factor, risk aversion, plays a key 
role. They theorized that less risk-averse people are less likely to take precautions, but 
also less likely to purchase insurance.  This then leads to a negative correlation between 
coverage and risk, and therefore advantageous selection, particularly in the presence of 
significant administrative costs. 
 
In a similar vein, Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008) found advantageous selection in the 
market for Medi-gap insurance (a supplement to Medicare).  They found that, 
controlling only for gender, age, and state of residence (the determinants of policy 
prices), Medi-gap policyholders spent on average $4,000 per year less on health care 
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than similar-aged Medicare recipients who do not purchase Medi-gap insurance.  
However, when they included a robust set of controls for health, they found that those 
with Medi-gap spend about $2,000 more than those without Medi-gap.  They controlled 
for additional individual attributes and found that when cognitive ability is controlled 
for, a negative correlation between coverage and ex-post claims is found, indicative of 
advantageous selection.  They proposed that as cognitive ability is correlated with both 
good health and the purchase of health insurance, it leads to a negative correlation 
between Medi-gap coverage and health risk.   
 
Underscoring the sometimes complex dynamics underpinning the demand for 
insurance, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) identified multiple forms of private 
information that can potentially affect the correlation between insurance coverage and 
risk occurrence.  They proposed that it is possible for two or more types of private 
information to have offsetting effects, leading to behavior that lacks a correlation 
between risk type and coverage.  In the long-term care insurance market, they identified 
wealth and healthcare preventive activities as being positively correlated with insurance 
coverage, and negatively correlated with risk. 
 
A range of other studies have produced varying results, which the authors attribute to 
the particular characteristics of the markets under study.  For example, Davidoff and 
Welke (2004) found evidence of advantageous selection in the reverse mortgage 
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insurance market. He (2008) found adverse selection in the life insurance market with 
significant correlation between mortality risk and life insurance coverage. 
 
More recently, Spinnewijn (2013) advanced the idea that risk misperception may also 
lead to selection in insurance markets.  His model assumes two types of risk 
misperceptions which, acting together, can lead to either adverse or advantageous 
selection.  Policyholders who are “baseline optimistic” believe their risks of experiencing 
insured events are lower than they actually are; such individuals demand less coverage 
and engage in less preventative effort, ceteris paribus.  Those who are “control 
optimistic” believe their efforts to mitigate potential negative health effects are more 
effective than they actually are.  Under Spinnewijn’s hypothesis, control optimistic 
individuals believe that the marginal return to effort is higher than it actually is, and 
therefore overinvest in effort and hence reduce their expected ex-post claims relative to 
an individual with accurate or pessimistic views about the return to effort.  All other 
things being equal, an individual who is control optimistic is likely to have lower claims, 
due to their greater amount of preventative care and avoidance of risky health 
behaviors.  Thus, whether adverse selection is possible rests on the relative influence of 
baseline and control optimism on insurance demand and prevention effort.   
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III.  Testing for Selection in a Hypothetical Market 
 
To our knowledge, a database that includes subject-level coverage and claims data as 
well as measures of subjective control and baseline optimism related to cancer risk and 
insurance does not exist.  As such, we take a novel approach to investigating selection in 
insurance markets.  Rather than analyzing historical insurance coverage and claims data, 
we classify subjects into four classes according to difference in willingness to pay and 
exertion efforts relative to the corresponding values given their true risk type.  We then 
determine who will purchase an insurance contract with fixed coverage at a given 
premium and how much effort they will exert.  This allows us determine how optimism 
influences the composition of insured parties and the effort they exert.  If the market is 
dominated by low-risk types who exert high levels of effort, we infer advantageous 
selection.  
 
Assume a group of risk-averse subjects who are identical in all respects save for their 
levels of baseline and control optimism. The subjects’ willingness to pay for insurance 
coverage R given their true risk type is price * fP P    where fP   is the actuarially 
fair price and   is equal to the risk premium the subject is willing to pay.  If a subject is 
baseline pessimistic, then they perceive their risk to be higher than their true risk type, 
and they will be willing to pay *hP P  for coverage R.  Baseline optimists will be willing 
to pay *lP P .  Thus if an insurer offers coverage R at P*, baseline optimists will reject 
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the coverage thereby underinsuring relative to their true risk type, whereas baseline 
pessimists will purchase it, considering it to be a bargain.   
 
Of course, whether this leads to adverse or advantageous selection depends on how 
baseline and control optimism influence behavior.  Assume that if the subjects 
understood the actual efficacy of prevention effort, they would invest E* in effort.  If the 
combined effects of baseline and control optimism lead the subject to overinvest in 
effort relative to their true risk type and preferences, then the invest *hE E , 
underinvestment attributable to baseline and control optimism is then *.lE E   
 
Define class ijC  where 1 if *
hi E E E    and 0 otherwise and 1 if *hj P P P    
and 0 otherwise. Thus, class 11C  expends more prevention effort and has a surplus 
willingness to pay, while 10C  expends excess effort but underinsures relative to their 
true risk type. To understand how this classification reveals selection, consider the case 
where only two classes exist in the market, 10C  (excess effort, deficient willingness to 
pay) and 01C  (deficient effort, excess willingness to pay).  As classed, these subjects are 
equal in all respect save for their level of control and baseline optimism and 
corresponding effort and willingness to pay.  If fair insurance based on the true risk type 
is offered, 10C  class will continue to overinvest in effort but will not insure since their 
willingness to pay is less than the premium offered. They will only enter the market if 
the price is dropped below *.P   The market will be dominated by the 01C  type since 
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their willingness to pay exceeds the fair price plus the risk premium.  This will cause 
adverse selection since the type that insures also underinvests in prevention effort.   
 
The outcome will differ depending on the mix of types.  Another simple case arises 
when the market is comprised of solely the 
11C  and 00C  types.  The former type will buy 
fair insurance and overinvest in effort whereas the latter type will reject the insurance 
even as they underinvest in prevention effort.  Thus the high-risk, low-effort type is 
driven out of the market by their optimism and the market will be composed of the low-
risk type, leading to advantageous selection.   
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IV.  Survey Considerations 
 
We conducted an online survey of 474 men and women aged 18 and over on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (AMT)1.  The AMT web service is essentially a labor market designed to 
match employers who need short tasks completed which require human intelligence to 
workers willing to complete the task.  The tasks, which typically require between 5 and 
45 minutes to complete, range from surveys and writing brief product descriptions to 
transcribing audio recordings.  Employers sign up for the service and post task 
descriptions together with a per-task compensation amount.  Employees select tasks 
using the web as the employer/employee interface.  
 
AMT has become increasingly popular over the past five years with social science and 
business researchers because of the ease of use of the platform and the streamlined 
and rapid process for recruiting study volunteers.  Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 
(2011) found that AMT is an inexpensive source for high-quality data.  They showed that 
participants are slightly more diverse than a typical internet sample and much more 
diverse than a sample based on university students.  They also found that the data 
quality was at least as high as a standard internet or telephone survey design.   
                                                          
1
 Note that we collected survey data from a total of 559 respondents (280 women, and 279 men); of 
these, we excluded a total of 85 survey responses for several reasons:  1) the survey respondent indicated 
she or he currently or previously had cancer, rendering the HCRI relative risk factors, and therefore our 
survey design, unapplicable; 2) the Amazon Mechanical Turk-provided latitude and longitude suggested 
the respondent was located outside the United States; 3) the respondent’s Amazon Mechanical Turk 
Identification Number or Internet Protocol address suggested a duplicate response. 
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For our study, the task was described to potential participants as a survey related to 
their beliefs about the cancer risks that would take about 20 minutes.  Subjects were 
given between $2.25 and $4.50 to complete the survey.  The survey used a split-sample 
design.  One half of the participants began the survey with information about the 
causes, risk factors, and prevention strategies for one of the three cancers of interest 
(colon, bladder and breast for women and bladder, colon, and prostate for men).  
Following the information section, these subjects began the questionnaire.  The other 
half of the subjects commenced with the questionnaire without any prior information 
given about cancer risks.  We created an indicator variable, info, which we use in our 
modeling efforts to control for the effects of the information booklet.    
The questionnaire has six components, described below:  
 
IV.A.  Risk Perception  
Risk perception and misperception have two dimensions in the survey.  We first queried 
subjects about their beliefs about the efficacy of cancer-prevention activities and 
perceptions of the riskiness, in terms of increased cancer risk, of different risky health 
behaviors.  The responses were combined with the expert-assessed efficacy of different 
activities and used to form measures of control optimism. The second dimension relates 
to the subject’s view of their own risk of contracting each one of the cancers.  
Comparing the subjective assessment of risk to the actual risk predicted by the HCRI 
allows us to calculate a measure of baseline optimism.  Below, we briefly describe the 
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risk-perception elicitation questions.  The formulas for the actual calculations for the 
two types of optimism are described in section V.    
 
Subjects were first asked to grade the decrease (increase) in relative risk in contracting a 
given cancer, contingent on undertaking specific preventative (risky) activities.2  The 
activities considered varied with the cancer.3  For example, risk factors for bladder 
cancer included smoking and exposure to chemicals, whereas risks for colon cancer 
included excessive red meat consumption and a low-calcium diet among others.  
Prevention activities for colon cancer included regular exercise, taking multivitamins and 
taking a daily aspirin, among others.    
 
Following the questions about relative risks, subjects were asked to state their personal 
risk of getting each one of the cancers in their lifetime, compared to the typical subject 
of their same age and gender.  The possible outcomes ranged from zero risk of getting 
the cancer (Zero. There is no chance of me getting this cancer), to very high risk (very 
much above average, five times or more above average).   
 
                                                          
2
 The relative risks for each preventative activity were presented as both ranges and qualitative 
descriptors as follows: not effective/does not reduce cancer risk, somewhat effective/reduces risk 
10% to 20% below the average person of the same age and gender, moderately effective/reduces 
risk 30% to 60% below the average, very effective/reduces risk 60% to 80% below the average, 
and extremely effective/reduces risk by more than 80% below the average.  
3
 The relative risks for each characteristic or behavior were presented as both ranges of relative 
risk and a qualitative descriptor as follows no risk increase, small risk increase, risk is higher but 
less than double the average risk, moderate risk increase to 2 to 4 times the average risk, large 
risk increase to 4 to 8 times the average risk, and very large risk increase to more than 8 times the 
average risk.   
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IV.B.  Risk Preference   
This section elicited a range for the risk aversion coefficient for the Constant Relative 
Risk Aversion utility function defined over mortality risks using the sequential multiple 
price list auction.  Details of this aspect of the experiment can be found in Riddel and 
Kolstoe (2013).  Briefly, the subjects read the following text describing the gambles they 
will face: 
Hypothetical Health Risk: Assume you have been diagnosed with a 
disease that will certainly be fatal in a year without treatment.  There are 
two treatments, but neither is effective 100% of the time.  Assume the 
costs of the treatment are the same, and neither treatment has side 
effects. 
 
The subjects were then given a sequence of paired lotteries, and asked to select the one 
they preferred.  For example, the first gamble presented was: 
Treatment A means a 30% chance of 8 more years of life and a 70% 
chance of 2 more years. Treatment B gives a 90% chance of 1 more year 
(the treatment fails) and a 10% chance of 13.5 more years.  
 
In subsequent gamble pairs, the outcome in treatment B was varied so that 
[ ] [ ]E A E B  gradually decreases, and eventually becomes negative.  The analyst notes 
where the subject switches from preferring lottery A to preferring lottery B, with later 
switch points indicating higher levels of risk aversion. 
 
IV.C.  Health History and Objective Cancer Risk 
Subjects were asked a detailed history of their activities, behaviors, and family history 
for things that may influence their risks of contracting the three cancers of interest.  
Questions covered their family history of the cancers in question and health related 
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behaviors such as exercise, vitamin use, smoking, chemical exposure, and alcohol use.  
The responses to these questions were used to provide an objective estimate of their 
risk of getting each of the cancers, using the HCRI from Colditz et al. (2000).4 
 
IV.D.   Cancer Insurance Demand 
The subjects next faced a single-bounded contingent valuation exercise to determine 
their demand for cancer insurance.  The insurance for males in the sample was 
described as follows: 
Assume that there is an insurance policy available that will cover any and 
all costs related to the covered cancers.  The cancers covered by the 
insurance are bladder cancer, prostate cancer, and colon cancer.5  
Considering your current budget, would you be willing to pay the 
following monthly premium for this insurance assuming it covered all 
related costs including diagnostic testing, office visits for specialists, 
hospital stays, treatment costs including chemotherapy and radiation, as 
well as FDA approved experimental treatments.  There are no copays or 
deductibles and you would be able to choose your own doctors and 
hospitals.  Please assume that your current insurance will not cover these 
cancers and that you will have to pay all of the costs yourself if you get 
any of these cancers. 
 
Subjects were randomly assigned a bid amount ranging from $5 to $135 per month and 
asked if they would be willing to pay that amount for the insurance as described.   
 
  
                                                          
4
 Note that the resulting (relative) risk estimates are normed against the U.S. population of 
persons of the same age and gender.  Although we know of no method of estimating cancer risk 
that can claim to be without error or possible bias, we assume that risk estimates derived using the 
HCRI methodology are sufficiently accurate to use in estimating subjects’ levels of baseline and 
control optimism. 
5
 Women were asked about insurance that covers bladder, colon and breast cancer. 
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IV.E.  Cognitive Ability.   
Subjects were asked to answer a series of 7 questions used in the Wonderlic cognitive 
ability test.  The subject scored a one on each question if they gave the correct answer 
and a zero otherwise.  The variable Cognitive Ability was calculated as the sum of the 
individual scores.    
 
IV.F.  Demographics. 
Subjects were asked their gender, age, income, ethnicity, education level, and marital 
status.  Variable Age is measured in years, variable Income is measured in thousands of 
dollars of annual income, while Boolean indicator variables are assigned based on 
whether one has completed at least a bachelor’s degree (College,) whether one is 
Married, is Male, is African American (Black), or Asian American (Asian). 
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V.  Indexes for Optimism and Effort 
 
Given subjects’ perceptions of their risk of contracting cancer and their beliefs about the 
efficacy of prevention efforts, we need to form measures of baseline and control 
optimism.  While there is no generally agreed on formula for combining perceived and 
actual risks, we believe that any measure allows us to easily understand the degree of 
optimism in terms of a relative risk i.e. subject believes their risk is half that of their true 
risk type.  Consistent with this thinking, we developed the measures described below.   
 
V.A.  Measure of Baseline Optimism 
A subject is baseline optimistic if they underestimate their true risk of cancer relative to 
those in the US population of their own age (and, in the case of breast and prostate 
cancers, of their same age and gender).  Thus, we measure Baseline Optimism by 
comparing each subject’s stated population-relative risk estimate of incidence for each 
of the three cancers, with the subject’s “actual” population-relative risk factor (“ARR”).  
We calculate the ARR by applying each subject’s responses to demographic, family 
history, and lifestyle questions in our survey to the risk estimates tabulated for those 
behaviors in the HCRI.  Given each subject’s survey answers, we then estimate the ARR 
of subject i's risk of incidence of cancer j as follows: 
 
 
( )
1
1
(1)
ok j
iij jk
ki
ARR RR
PD





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where   0k j  is the number of relative risk factors for cancer j identified in the HCRI, i  
is a vector of subject i’s demographic characteristics, family history, and lifestyle 
choices,  ijkRR   is the HCRI relative risk measure for subject i for factor k of cancer j, 
and  iPD   is a population denominator derived from the National Cancer Institute’s 
Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) Program.6  As cited in Colditz et al. 
2000, the resulting population-relative risk factor gives expert opinion-derived estimates 
of given subject’s risk of incidence of cancer j, relative to the US population of persons 
the same age (and for breast and prostate cancers, gender).  Thus, a ARRi,j value of 1.0 
implies subject i has an average risk of cancer j incidence equal to the average of 
persons in the U.S. of the same age and gender; a value of 2.0 suggests cancer risk that 
is twice the average, and a value of 0.5 suggests cancer risk that is half the U.S. average. 
 
The survey asked subjects to estimate their risk of contracting each of three cancers 
(colon, bladder, and breast for women; colon, bladder, and prostate for men), again 
relative to persons their same age and gender.  Consistent with the methodology 
suggested in Colditz et al. (2000), we structured survey questions to range from “Very 
much below average risk,” corresponding to a relative risk value of 0.2, to “Very much 
above average risk,” corresponding to a relative risk value of 5.0.7 We label subject i’s 
                                                          
6
 Note that as we did not have access to the SEER population denominator for prostate cancer, we 
used an estimate of 1.107372, based on the average (non-normalized) relative risk factors of our 
sample of 218 men. 
7
 In addition to the seven levels of relative risk suggested in Colditz et al. 2000, we also allowed 
survey respondents to select “No risk,” which we code as a relative risk factor equal to 0.01. 
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stated estimates of relative risk of cancer j as SRRij, and then using values for ARRij and 
SRRij, we can create a measure of subjects’ baseline optimism as follows: 
. (2)
ij
ij 2
ij
ARR
Baseline Optimism log
SRR
 
   
 
  
Here, a value for Baseline Optimism of 0.0 implies that a subject’s own estimates of 
cancer incidence risk (for cancer j) are identical to the expert-derived HCRI estimates, 
based on her responses to survey questions regarding demographic, family, and lifestyle 
characteristics.  A Baseline Optimism value of 1.0 indicates that the subject’s estimates 
of cancer incidence risk are half of the expert-derived value (making her risk perceptions 
relatively optimistic), and a Baseline Optimism value of -1.0 indicates the subject’s risk 
estimates are twice that of the expert value (making her risk perception relatively 
pessimistic).  Each increase (decrease) of one point in our measure thus has the effect of 
doubling the amount by which expert risk assessments exceed (are exceeded by) 
subjects’ own-risk estimates. 
 
Next, we calculate on overall all estimate of each subject’s tendency to exhibit baseline 
optimism by taking the average of the separate measures for each of the three cancers 
considered in our study: 
   
3 3
1 1
3 3
1 1
. (3)
ij
i ij 2
j j ij
ARR
Baseline Optimism Baseline Optimism log
SRR 
 
    
 
 
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Figure 1 gives the distribution of Baseline Optimism for males and females.  Roughly ¾ 
of each gender in our sample are baseline optimistic.  The distribution for females is 
somewhat higher variance (std. dev.=1.55) than that of males (std. dev.=1.24).   
 
Figure 1. Histograms of Baseline and Control Optimism for Males and Females 
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Control Optimism: Males
 
Baseline Optimism:  Females 
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V.B.  Measures of Control Optimism 
We label a subject as “Prevention Control Optimistic” if she believes that engaging in 
beneficial activities is more effective in reducing cancer risks than it actually is.  
Similarly, we label a subject as “Risk Control Optimistic” if he believes that engaging in a 
particular risky activity is more likely to lead to cancer than it actually is; we therefore 
infer that he overestimates his ability to reduce cancer risks by avoiding or curtailing the 
risky activity in question. 
 
The survey contained a set of questions for each cancer about perceptions of the 
relative riskiness of different activities that increase or decrease cancer risk.  For a given 
cancer j and beneficial activity k, subjects were asked to estimate risk-reducing factors 
between no risk reduction effect (RR=1.0) and a risk reduction of ten-fold (RR=0.1).  
Comparing these estimates with “actual” expert estimates for each cancer and 
preventative measure associated with each cancer, subject i’s level of prevention 
control optimism is then estimated as: 
3
1
( )3
1
( ) 1 1
(4)
prev
prev
j
k j
jk
i 2
k j j k jk
APRR
Prevention_Control_Optimism log
SPRR

 
 
      
 
 
where  prevk j  is the number of preventative measures identified in the HCRI for cancer 
j, jkAPRR  is the HCRI-assessed “actual” post-preventative behavior k relative risk of 
cancer j, and jkSPRR  is the subject’s estimates of relative risk of incidence of cancer j, 
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assuming behavior k (with possible responses coded with RR values ranging from 0.1 to 
1.0).   
 
By taking the base-2 logarithm of this ratio, and averaging over the total number of 
preventative measures identified for each of the three cancers in question, we arrive at 
a measure of optimism exhibited by subject i for a typical preventative measure.  A 
Prevention_Control_Optimism value of 0.0 suggests the subject’s estimates of 
prevention effectiveness are, on average, equal to the “actual” expert estimates.  A 
measure of 1.0 implies that on average, the subject believes preventative measures are 
twice as effective as they actually are; a measure of -1.0 implies that on average, the 
subject believes preventative measures are half as effective as they actually are. 
 
Similarly, but with one crucial difference, we estimate each subject’s level of risk control 
optimism as follows: 
3
1
( )3
1
( ) 1 1
(5)
risk
risk
j
k j
jk
i 2
k j j k jk
SRRR
Risk_Control_Optimism log
ARRR

 
 
      
 
 
where  riskk j is the number of risky activities identified in the HCRI for cancer j, jkARRR                   
is the HCRI-assessed “actual” post-preventative behavior k relative risk of cancer j, and 
jkSRRR  is the subject’s estimates of relative risk of incidence of cancer j, assuming 
behavior k (with responses coded with RR values ranging from 1.0 to 5.0).  Note that to 
produce a consistent meaning the ratio between stated and “actual” risk factors is 
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inverted relative to preventative activities.  That is, if a subject’s stated risk estimate for 
a given cancer and risky behavior is double the “actual” expert relative risk value, she is 
a Risk Control Optimist for that particular activity and cancer combination.   
 
Finally, we average the values of the two variables for each subject, to arrive at a 
characteristic level of control optimism for each subject:8
 12 _ _ (6)i i iControl Optimism Prevention_Control_Optimism Risk Control Optimism 
  
An overall Control Optimism measure of 0.0 indicates that the subject accurately 
assesses the efficacy of prevention efforts.  When Control Optimism = 1, the subject 
believes engaging in preventative measures (avoiding risky activities) is twice as 
effective in reducing cancer risk than is actually the case; a measure of -1 implies that, 
on average, the subject believes exerting such effort is half as effective in reducing 
cancer risk as it actually is.  
 
The distribution of Control Optimism for males and females is given on the right-hand 
side of Figure 1.  Roughly 93% of males and 90% of females are optimistic about 
prevention activities.  Both the male and female Control Optimism distributions have 
significant right skew, with the male distribution being markedly platykurtic, and the 
female distribution somewhat less so.    
                                                          
8
 Note that we elected to weight values for prevention and risk control optimism equally in this 
estimate, rather than weighting by the number of preventative or risk-related attributes for each 
cancer.  We did this to avoid overweighting the influence of risk-related attributes, of which more 
were identified in the HCRI (29 for women, 24 for men) than were preventative-related attributes 
(18 for women and 13 for men). 
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V.C.  Measure of Preventative Effort and Associated Change in Cancer Risk 
To estimate the level of effort each subject exerts in relation to cancer-avoiding or 
cancer-inducing activities, we employ a composite index based on the relative risks from 
the HCRI for three activities associated with reducing at least one of the three cancers 
(exercising at least three hours a week, taking a daily vitamin D supplement, and taking 
a daily baby aspirin) and three risky behaviors (high red meat consumption, high alcohol 
consumption, and cigarette consumption):9 
 
6
1
(7)i im 2 m
m
Preventative Effort log RR

  
 
where 
im  is a boolean operator, indicating whether subject i  engages in 
preventative/risky behavior m , and 
mRR  is the relative risk associated with activity m. 
We construct the index such that engaging in risk-reducing activities will contribute a 
positive value to our index of preventative effort, while engaging in risk-increasing 
activities will contribute negative values to the index. 
 
Note that to more accurately identify a potential causative effect between risk 
perception and risk-related behavior, we restrict the activities in our index to those that 
can be directly controlled by subjects in the near- to mid-term.  Thus, we exclude 
relative risk measures for, say, a subject’s body mass index, as one’s body weight may 
                                                          
9
 Note that for cigarette consumption, the HCRI identifies four different levels of risk:  1) non-
smoker; 2) smoking less than 1 pack per day; 3) smoking between 1-2 packs per day; 4) smoking 
more than 2 packs per day. 
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not be a direct measure of near- to mid-term choices, but rather may be a result of life-
long eating and exercising habits, as well as genetics. 
 
A Preventative Effort index value of 0.0 implies that a subject engages in none of these 
six behaviors with bearing on cancer risk, or alternatively that he engages in a 
combination of risky and preventative behaviors in such a way that his risk is the same 
as if he engaged in none of them.  An index value of 1.0 implies that when confronted 
with the decision of engaging or not engaging in each of these six behaviors, the 
subject’s choices are such that (in aggregate) his risk of incidence of one or more of the 
identified three cancers is half what it would be if he engaged in none of these activities.  
An index value of -1.0 implies his risk is twice what it would otherwise be.  Importantly, 
the prevention index can be used to translate differences in prevention effort into 
expected differences in cancer risk, using the formula:  
 
_
% 100[2 1]. (8)i
Preventative Effort
Cancer Risk
  
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VI.  Selection Model and Results 
 
As noted above, rather than inferring selection from correlations between actual 
coverage and claims, we investigate how baseline and control optimism influence the 
composition and behavior of consumers in our hypothetical cancer-insurance market.  
To do so, we must first gauge how optimism influences willingness to pay for coverage 
and prevention effort.  In the models results below, we determine if optimism 
influences cancer-prevention activity, hence cancer risk and expected claims.  In the 
subsequent sub-section, we estimate models of willingness to pay for insurance as a 
function of optimism and a set of control variables. For both sets of models, we include 
a model with all subjects as well as models of the individual genders to account for the 
fact that males and females were asked about a different set of cancers.   
 
VI.A.  Optimism and Preventative Behavior 
To test whether optimism affects behavior, we examine the relationship between 
engaging in either risky health behaviors or prevention activities as a function of 
baseline and control optimism. Prevention and risk-taking behavior is captured in the 
index for prevention, Prevention Effort, described above.  It is possible that prevention 
effort and optimism are endogenous.  We test for endogeneity using the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test (Wooldridge 2003 pg. 506).  There is no evidence of endogenity, so we 
estimate the model using least-squares regression with standard errors corrected for 
heteroskedasticity.  The regressions also control for other attributes of each subject that 
29 
 
are likely to correlate with prevention effort such as cognitive ability, risk preferences, 
age, income, education, marital status and ethnicity.  The results are reported in 
Table 1:   
 
 
Table 1.  OLS Models of Prevention Effort:  Dependent Variable is Prevention Effort index 
 
The first column includes all subjects, while the second and thirds columns estimate 
models for subsamples of men and women, respectively.  Because Prevention Effort is 
constructed according to a 2log  scale, direct interpretation of the coefficients is difficult.  
To aid the reader in understanding the model results, we have calculated the change in 
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cancer-mortality risk for changes from a specified baseline relative risk for each of the 
statistically significant independent variables.  The results are reported in Table 2:10   
 
 
Table 2.  Effects of a Change in the Independent Variables in Table 1 on Cancer Risk as a Result 
of a Change in Prevention Effort 
 
According to the models, ethnicity, marital status, income, risk aversion, and cognitive 
ability are not significant predictors of prevention in any of the three models.  Age is not 
significant in the female model, but has a convex relationship with prevention effort in 
the all-subjects and male models.  The minimum effort level occurs at 45 years’ age in 
both models, suggesting that as subject’s age, their prevention effort declines until 
                                                          
10 To calculate the percent change in cancer risk attributable to the relevant independent variable, 
we first calculate the change in the prevention for a change in variable jX as  
_ ( ) .j j
j
Effort
Preventative Effort X X
X

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
 The change in cancer risk is then 
_ ( )
% 100[2 1]j
j
Preventative Effort X
XCancer Risk

   .   
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about the population median age (about 46 years old in the U.S.), then increases 
thereafter.   Thus, if the average 45-year old male were to change his behavior so as to 
engage in preventative effort at the same level as the average 31-year old (the 25th 
percentile of the population age distribution), his age-adjusted risk of cancer would drop 
by 8%. Similarly, is he were to boost his preventative efforts to match those of the 
average 58-year old, his age-adjusted cancer risk would fall by 8.2%.   
 
The model results indicate that baseline optimism leads to higher cancer risks for the 
majority of the subjects in the sample.  Subjects with baseline optimism measures in the 
highest quartile of distribution engage in behaviors that, as a result of this optimism, 
increase their cancer risk by at least 13.7%.  The figure is slightly lower for males (11.5%) 
and higher for females (15.6%).  For the median subject, cancer risks are increased by 
4.9% in the all-subjects model.  The lowest quartile of subjects, who are baseline 
pessimistic, actually experience a modest decline in their cancer risk.   
 
We hypothesized that control optimists, believing that preventative activities are more 
effective than they actually are, would engage in more effort and thereby lower their 
cancer risks.  The model results bear this out.  In the all subjects model, the most 
optimistic 25% of the sample experience a 13.3% or greater decline in their cancer risk 
as a result of relatively high level of prevention effort.  As with baseline optimism, the 
effect is slightly stronger for females.  The effect of control optimism on cancer risk is 
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still quite large at the median and in the lowest quartile, with cancer risks falling by 8.9% 
and by as much as 4.2%, respectively, in the all-subjects model.   
 
VI.B.  Baseline Optimism and Demand for Insurance 
The second component of selection concerns the willingness to pay for full insurance.  
We estimate three probit regressions (all subjects, male and female) with the 
dependent variable 1Yes   if the subject agrees to pay the stated premium for 
insurance and zero otherwise.  The regressors include Premium (the insurance premium 
offered to the subject), Cognitive Ability, Risk Aversion, and a set of demographic 
controls.  To investigate the effect of baseline optimism on the demand for insurance, 
the models include Baseline Optimism and the Baseline Optimism*Info interaction 
variable.  The interaction variable allows us to test whether the information on cancer 
risks and causes provided immediately prior completing the survey mitigates the 
distortionary influence that optimism about one’s cancer risk may have on the 
insurance-purchase decision. Again, we conducted a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
(Wooldridge 2003 pg. 506) and failed to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of 
Baseline Optimism in the probit model.   
 
The model results appear in Table 3.  In the all-subjects model, the coefficient of the 
premium amount is negative and statistically significant, indicating that as the plan 
premium increases, people demand less cancer insurance, all else equal.  Older subjects 
and higher-income subjects have a higher willingness to pay for the insurance than their 
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younger, lower-income counterparts.  Subjects who report that they are of African or 
Asian descent have a higher willingness to pay than those who self-report as Caucasian 
or Hispanic.  Cognitive ability and risk aversion are not significant in the model. The 
average willingness to pay for insurance is $51.03 per month. 
 
 
Table 3.  Probit Models of Willingness to Pay for Insurance:  Dependent Variable Equals One if 
the Subject Agreed to the Insurance at the Offered Premium 
 
The model results for males appear in column 2.  The average willingness to pay for 
males is lower than the full sample at $36.34 per month. The coefficient of the baseline 
optimism variable is negative and statistically significant (p-value=0.06), whereas the 
coefficient of the Baseline Optimism*Information interaction variable is positive and 
statistically significant (p-value=0.04).  We infer that the higher the subject’s baseline 
optimism, the less likely the subjects is to agree to purchase the insurance at the stated 
34 
 
premium amount.  As a consequence, the willingness to pay for insurance is lower for 
male subjects who are overly optimistic about their cancer risks.  The effect is 
significantly attenuated for subjects who received the information on risk and 
prevention strategies prior to filling out the questionnaire, as evidenced by the positive 
and significant coefficient of the interaction of the optimism and information variables. 
 
Like the model including all of the subjects, black men are willing to pay significantly 
more for the insurance than Caucasians.  Willingness to pay is increasing in income, with 
an additional $1000 of income increasing willingness to pay by about $0.65 per month.  
According to the model, willingness to pay for men is independent of age, marital status, 
and whether or not they have a college degree.  Risk aversion and cognitive ability are 
also not statistically significant.   
 
Column 3 gives the results of the insurance model for females.  As expected, the 
coefficient of the premium amount is negative and significant, indicating that the higher 
the premium offered to the subject, the more likely they are to refuse the insurance.  
The average willingness to pay for insurance implied by the model is $63.67 per month.  
As with the model for males, cognitive ability and risk aversion are not statistically 
significant.  In contrast with the males in the sample, baseline optimism does not appear 
to influence female willingness to pay for insurance.  Rather, demographic variables 
seem to be most important.  While age did not play a role among males, the coefficient 
of age in the female sample is positive and significant.  Accordingly, women are willing 
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to pay roughly $1 per month more for insurance as they age one year.  As in the male 
sample, willingness to pay for insurance is increasing in income, with an additional 
$1000 in income increasing willingness to pay by about $0.35 per month.  Asian women 
are willing to pay more for insurance than those of other ethnicities.    
 
VI.C.  Insurance Selection Classification Model 
We now turn to an effort to classify the male subjects in our sample according to their 
excess willingness to pay for insurance and excess prevention effort.11  We define the 
two variables that represent excess prevention and excess willingness that results from 
optimism, holding all other model variables constant: 
, ,
,
i CO PE i BO PE i
i BO WTP i
Excess Prevention Effort Control Optimism Baseline Optimism
ExcessWTP Baseline Optimism
 

   
 
   
where ,CO PE  and ,BO PE  are the estimated coefficients of Control Optimism and 
Baseline Optimism, respectively, in the prevention effort models, and ,BO DEM   is the 
estimated coefficient of Baseline Optimism in the insurance demand model.  Note that 
these variables measure effort and willingness to pay for insurance relative to what the 
subject would engage in if he knew his true risk type.  Thus positive (negative) values 
represent excess (deficient) effort and willingness to pay relative to the true risk type.  
We allow our measures of excess willingness to pay and effort to vary with ,iX  a 
column vector of individual i ’s characteristics; prevβ and ,wtpβ  column vectors of 
                                                          
11
 Because we did not find evidence that female demand for insurance is correlated with baseline optimism, 
we conducted this particular exercise for male subjects only. 
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parameters; and corresponding measurement and/or observation errors ,prev iu  and 
, ,wtp iu  as follows : 
,
,
(9 )
(9 )
i i prev prev i
i i wtp wtp i
Excess Prevention Effort u a
Excess WTP u b
  
  
X β
X β
  
For example, the joint probability that the subject falls in Class 11C  is then: 
   
11,
, , , ,
( 0; 0) (10)
0; 0 ;
i i i
i prev prev i i wtp wtp i i prev prev i i wtp wtp i
p P Excess Prevention Effort ExcessWTP
P u u P u u
  
             X β X β X β X β
 
If we make the simplifying assumption that the measurement/observation errors are 
independently and identically distributed, with a bivariate normal distribution and 
correlation , with 2 0prev   and  
2 0,wtp   i.e. 
, , 0 1
, , , (11)
0 1
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u u
N

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      
       
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then a consistent estimator for the classification probability is:  
 11, 2 ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ; | , , , (12)i i prev i wtp prev wtpp     X β X β  
where parameters ˆ ˆ, ,p d   and ˆ ,  and parameter vectors 
ˆ
prevβ  and 
ˆ
wtpβ  are estimated 
using bivariate probit.  We then apply the resulting parameter estimates and individual 
characteristic vector iX  to (12) to estimate the respective probabilities of subject i  
falling into each of the four classes, 11, 10, 01, 00,, , , .i i i ip p p and p
12 
                                                          
12
 For clarity’s sake, and without loss of generality, we will restrict our discussion throughout this section 
to estimates for the C11 classification.  Calculations for the three classes (C10, C01, and C00) involves a 
straightforward switching of the indices and the corresponding signs of the probit regressands.  
Alternatively, we could change the direction of one or more of the inequalities in (10), and then adjust the 
cdf calculation in (12) accordingly.  For example, 
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One must be cautious when interpreting these classifications.  They represent subjects’ 
excess willingness to pay and excess effort relative to their true risk type, after 
extracting other sources of heterogeneity in these variables.  As such, they give us 
information about how optimism alone may induce selection, controlling for other 
factors such as cognitive ability and risk aversion that could also potentially lead to 
selection in an insurance market.  Thus, they are not tests for selection in total, but only 
represent the possible contribution of optimism to selection.  Nevertheless, when 
aggregated over a sizable population they give helpful insights into the type of insurance 
purchasing and preventative-related behavior in which members of the population are 
likely to engage.  The results of the bivariate probit model are reported in Table 4. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Prevention Effort  
Indicator 
WTP 
Indicator 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Risk Averse -0.024 0.035 0.020 0.036 
Cognitive Ability 0.001 0.079 0.002 0.086 
Black -0.031 0.477 -0.259 0.606 
Asian 0.333 0.345 0.465 0.338 
Age 0.039 0.054 -0.006 0.055 
Age^2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Income ($000) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
College 0.146 0.187 0.257 0.201 
Married 0.144 0.215 -0.437* 0.236 
n 218 
rho 0.729 
Wald chi-
squared(18) 
16.56 
(p-value = 0.553) 
 
Table 4.  Results of the Bivariate Probit Classification Model 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 10, , ,ˆ ˆˆ ;i i prev prev i i wtp wtp ip P u u      X β X β    , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ;i prev prev i i prev prev i i wtp wtp iP u P u u          X β X β X β
   2 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ| ; | , , .i prev prev i prev i wtp prev wtp       X β X β X β  
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VI.D.  Population Classification Predictions and Confidence Intervals 
One useful application of this model is to estimate the proportion of our sample that 
falls into each of the four classifications.  Given consistent estimates for individual 
classification probabilities, derived by applying (12) above, a linear combination of these 
estimates yields a consistent estimator for population classification ratios: 
   1 111 11, 2
1 1
ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ; | , , , (13)
n n
i i prev i wtp prev wtpn n
i i
P E p   
 
      X β X β  
where 11,iP  is the estimated proportion of the population that fall in the 11C  
classification13. 
 
Construction of confidence intervals on the classification estimator is not nearly as 
straightforward, due to the fact that the estimator employs a non-linear transformation, 
the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function  2 .  Therefore, we cannot 
employ a simple linear combination of estimated variances 2ˆ prev  and 
2ˆ
wtp  to in turn 
estimate the variance and thus the standard error 
11
ˆ
P of classification probability 11Pˆ . 
 
To solve this problem, we employed two methods: the delta method, and 
bootstrapping. 
  
  
                                                          
13
 As before, for simplicity’s sake we will restrict our discussion to the C11 classification.  However, 
calculation of classification predictions for the other three classes involves a straightforward switching of 
the indices and the corresponding signs of the probit regressands. 
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VI.D.1.  Using the Delta Method to Construct Classification Confidence Intervals 
As outlined in Greene (2012, pp. 68-69), Feiveson (1999), and Oehlert (1992), the delta 
method can be used to estimate the standard errors of a vector of transformed 
parameters.  Here, we follow and adapt the derivation from Greene for a bivariate 
probit objective function.  We first define 
 
   11, 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ; | , , , ; | , , (14)i prev wtp i prev wtp i i prev i wtp prev wtpf p        β β X X β X β  
 
as a function of the least squares estimators of the two latent biprobit indexes.  We take 
vector ,iX containing observations on each of the 9p   regressors for subject i , as well 
as sample population parameters ˆ ˆ, ,prev wtp   and ˆ ,  as given and determined.   
 
Then, dropping the exogenous terms for clarity’s sake, and assuming that  ˆ ˆ;i prev wtpf β β  
is both continuous and continuously differentiable at true parameter values prevβ  and 
,wtpβ  we then define 
ˆ ˆ;
ˆ
ˆ ˆ; (15)
ˆ ˆ;
ˆ
T
i prev wtp
T
prev
i prev wtp
i prev wtp
T
wtp
f
f
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(β β )
β
C (β β )
(β β )
β
 
as a 1 2p  row vector of first derivatives, with respect to each of the 2 p parameters.  
For the sake of clarity, the derivation of the partial derivatives specified in (15), for a 
bivariate normal cumulative distribution function, is shown in detail in Appendix II. 
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By applying the Slutsky theorem (Greene 2012, pg. 1073) to (15), we then have: 
ˆ ˆplim  ; ; (16 )i prev wtp i prev wtpf f a(β β ) (β β )
 
and 
;
ˆ ˆplim ; . (16 )
;
T
i prev wtp
T
prev
i prev wtp i
i prev wtp
T
wtp
f
b
f
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
(β β )
β
C (β β ) Γ
(β β )
β
 
To apply the delta method, we then expand function if  using a first-order Taylor series 
approximation, and have: 
ˆ
ˆ ˆ; ; (17)
ˆ
prev prev
i prev wtp i prev wtp i
wtp wtp
f f
 
 
    
 
 
β β
(β β ) (β β ) Γ
β β
 
Then, applying Greene’s derivation (Greene 2012, pg. 69) to the bivariate normal 
cumulative distribution function, the estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix is 
then: 
 
   
   
11,
1 1
2
2
1 1
2
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆˆ Est. Asy. Var ; . (18)
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
i
T T
prev prev wtp
T
p i prev wtp i i
T T
prev wtp wtp
f
  

  
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
X X X X
(β β ) C C
X X X X
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Estimates for 
11,
2ˆ
ip
 and 
11, 11,
2ˆ ˆ
i ip p
   are then readily derived from the observed data.  
Figure 2 contains histograms depicting the distribution of estimated standard errors, 
,
ˆ ,
XX ip
  for each of the four individual classification probability estimators. 
 
 
(a) Distribution of 
10,
ˆ
ip
    (b)  Distribution of 
11,
ˆ
ip
  
 
 
(c) Distribution of 
00,
ˆ
ip
    (d)  Distribution of 
01,
ˆ
ip
  
 
Figure 2.  Histograms of the Estimated Standard Errors of Individual Classification Probabilities 
 
If we assume the independence of each subject’s estimate 
11,
2ˆ ,
ip
  we can show that the 
classification estimator meets the conditions for the Liapunov Central Limit Theorem 
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and the Lindeberg-Feller Central Limit Theorem, and therefore conclude that the 
distribution of 
11,
21
1
ˆ
i
n
pn
i


 is asymptotically normal (Rao 1973, pg. 127, also Amemiya 
1985, pg. 92).   
Then, we have: 
     
 
11
11, 11, 11
11 11
11
11
2 1 1
11 11, 11, 11, 11,( 1)
1 1
2 2 21 1 1
( 1) ( 1) 1
1 1
2 21
1
2
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ0
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
ˆ . (19)
1
i i
n n n
P i i i jn n n
i i j i
n n
p p pn n n n n
i i
P pn
p
P
Var P Var p Var p Cov p p
n

  
 



  
  
 

  
     
   
   
 
 

  
 
 
 
Applying the normality assumption, the two end points for a  1   percent confidence 
interval, for the population classification estimate 11,P  can then be constructed as: 
 
11
11
11, 11 1, /2
11, 11 1, /2
ˆ ˆ (20)
ˆ ˆ
LB n P
UB n P
P P t
P P t






  
  
 
 
The resulting confidence interval estimates for 0.05   are shown in Table 5, alongside 
estimates derived from the bootstrapping method. 
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VI.D.2.  Using Bootstrapping to Estimate Classification Confidence Intervals  
To motivate our use of bootstrapping, we first define 11Z  to be the total number of 
members of sample population n  who properly fall within classification 11C .
14  Since the 
individual classification probabilities are assumed to be independent, we can express 
11Z as the sum of n  Bernoulli variables: 
11
1
,
n
i
i
Z b

    where 11, 11,( 1) , ( 0) 1 . (21)i i i iP b p P b p      
Note that if the values for 11, 0 ,ip p i n    that is, if individual classification 
probabilities are all equal, and deterministic (i.e., measured without error), then the 
probability mass function for 11Z  would follow a binomial distribution, with mean 0np  
and variance  0 01np p  (Ross 2010, pg. 54).  From there it would be straightforward to 
calculate the probability mass function of population classification ratio 111 11,nP Z   and 
because binomial distributions are asymptotically normal as 
0
1
p
n   , to apply the 
Central Limit Theorem and estimate confidence intervals for the distribution of 11P  
(Wackerly 2008, pg. 379). 
 
Since neither of these premises is true, we must find another way of estimating the 
probability mass function of 11,Z  and therefore to derive confidence intervals for 11P . 
In addition to the Delta Method described in section VI.D.1., we can also employ the 
bootstrap method. 
                                                          
14
 As before, we follow the discussion for classification C11 only, for simplicity’s sake. 
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Note that two stages of randomization are required to properly employ bootstrapping in 
this context:  a first stage to randomly assign values to measurement/observation errors 
,prev iu  and , ,wtp iu  and thereby to calculate individual classification probabilities 11, ;ip  and, 
a second stage of randomization to “test” whether each individual Bernoulli variable 
results in a classification or non-classification, as specified in (21).  The number of 
individuals thus classified then represents one bootstrapped measurement of 11,Z  and 
by repeating this procedure a number of times, we can estimate the distribution 
function of 11,Z  and thereby of 
1
11 11,nP Z   enabling us to estimate confidence intervals 
for the proportion of our sample properly classified in 11.C  
 
In our first step, we randomly assign values to measurement/observation errors ,prev iu  
and ,wtp iu for each individual, using our assumption from (11) that these stochastic error 
terms are independently and identically distributed, with a bivariate normal distribution 
and with correlation  :  , ,
0 1
, , .
0 1
prev i wtp i
prev wtp
u u
N

 
      
       
     
 
Once we have selected appropriate values for these error terms, we then use them to 
calculate the resulting (perturbed) classification probability for each individual:   
 * * *11, 2 , ,ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ; | , , . (22)i prev i prev i wtp i wtp i prev wtpp X u X u          
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In our second stage of randomization, we generate a separate uniform random variable 
(0,1)iv Uniform  for each individual, then sum the number of individuals whose 
individual classification probability  *11,ˆ ip exceeds their corresponding value for iv .  By 
doing so, we satisfy the Bernoulli condition specified in (21). 
  
Now, as a function defined on stochastic variables, 11Z  is itself stochastic, with its own 
(unspecified) distribution, which may not necessarily be normal.  To construct an 
interval with confidence level  1 ,  we then empirically calculate endpoints 
 11, 11,
0
argmax ,
2
k
LB q
k q
Z Count Z m


 
   
 
   and 
 11, 11,argmin . (23)
2
m
UB q
k q k
Z Count Z m


 
   
 
  
Finally, we construct end points for each respective population classification confidence 
interval as: 
1
11, 11,
1
11, 11, (24)
LB LBm
UB UBm
P Z
P Z
 
 
 
The classifications arising from the model, with 80m  , are given in Table 5.  
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Table 5.  Subject Population Classified as Adverse or Advantageous Selectors Based on Bivariate 
Probit Model, with Confidence Intervals derived from the Delta Method and Bootstrap 
Procedure
15
 
   
 
VI.E.  Classification Results 
Some 77 percent of our male subjects are thus estimated to fall into either class 00C   or 
10C , indicating that these subjects will reject a policy with premium equal to the fair 
price plus a risk premium.  By contrast, a smaller portion (~22 percent) of our male 
subjects are estimated to fall into the 11C  class, implying their pessimism about their 
cancer risk would lead them to purchase the insurance contract at the fair price plus a 
premium, while simultaneously engaging in more prevention effort than they would if 
                                                          
15
 * - Note that for the C01 classification, 
01
ˆ 0.013p   is of the same order of magnitude as 
01
ˆ 0.008p  , 
and the estimated lower bound for 
01pˆ is actually negative, which has no economic meaning.  We are 
therefore hesitant to conclude that the normality approximation is sufficiently accurate for this particular 
classification, and take the constructed confidence interval as suggestive only. 
Classification
C11:
Increased Effort,
Increased Ins
Demand
(Advantageous)
C10:
Increased Effort,
Decreased Ins
Demand
(Adverse)
C01:
Decreased Effort,
Increased Ins
Demand
(Adverse)
C00:
Decreased Effort,
Decreased Ins
Demand
(Advantageous)
Estimated 
Proportion in 
Class 0.216 0.399 0.013 0.372
Standard Error on 
Estimate 
(Delta Method) 0.0137 0.0081 0.0080 0.0136
95% Confidence 
Interval 
(Delta Method) 0.189 - 0.243 0.383 - 0.415 0.000* - 0.029 0.345 - 0.399
95% Confidence 
Interval 
(Bootstrapping) 0.167 - 0.266 0.330 - 0.467 0.000 - 0.026 0.305 - 0.439
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they knew their true risk type.  Indeed, they will see this policy as a bargain.  Only a 
small number of subjects (~2 percent) are predicted to fall in the 01C  class, implying 
purchase of the insurance contract while simultaneously under-investing in preventative 
measures, leading to adverse selection16. 
 
Thus, controlling for risk aversion and cognitive ability, our sample is consistent with a 
market that is composed primarily of relatively low-risk types who engage in more 
prevention than the subjects who refuse the fair insurance.  Subjects who are optimistic 
about their cancer risk, who comprise most of our sample, reject fair insurance. Thus, 
pessimism about cancer risk and optimism about the efficacy of prevention effort lead 
to advantageous selection.  
                                                          
16
 Only 2 percent of our male subjects are estimated to be classified in the C01 quadrant; this is an 
unsurprising result, considering the strong tendency for all subjects, both male and female, to be both 
control optimistic and baseline optimistic.  In order to be classified in the C01 quadrant, one would have 
to exhibit both baseline pessimism (leading to higher willingness to pay) and have a control pessimism 
measure of a relatively large magnitude, enough to overcome the effects of baseline pessimism on 
preventative effort (in net, leading to decreased exertion).  Our results suggest we cannot be confident 
any of our subjects exhibited such a combination of risk misperceptions. 
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VII.  Discussion 
 
The models show that heterogeneity in risk perceptions can indeed play a key role in 
selection in insurance markets.  For one, we show that 77 percent of our sample are 
baseline optimistic while 90 percent are control optimistic, indicating that people’s 
perceptions of risk and prevention efficacy are not well aligned with expert’s 
assessments.  We show that baseline optimism lowers male subjects’ willingness to pay 
below what it would be if they knew their true risk type.  We also show that baseline 
optimism discourages prevention effort, raising overall cancer risk.  Nevertheless, 
control optimism leads subjects to engage in more effort, thereby lowering their 
aggregate risk of the cancers in question.   
 
Our classification model indicates that the interaction of baseline and control optimism 
on subject’s willingness to pay for insurance and prevention efforts results in 
advantageous selection where high-risk types reject coverage and only low-risk types 
with high levels of prevention effort are insured.  Of course, different samples could give 
different outcomes.  If, for example, our sample was dominated by subjects who were 
sufficiently pessimistic about prevention efficacy that they under-invested in 
prevention, they we would have inferred adverse selection rather than the 
advantageous selection we found here.   
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One of the perhaps more intriguing findings is the difference between the insurance 
models for males and females.  While baseline and control optimism influence 
preventative behavior for both genders, the average woman’s willingness to pay for 
insurance is not a function of baseline optimism.  Of course, women and men were 
queried about a different set of cancers.  It could well be that this is the source of this 
disparity, rather than any inherent differences between how men and women act on 
their risk perceptions.  Others have shown that highly-publicized risks, especially 
associated with a dreaded disease such as breast cancer, may lead to exaggerated 
perceptions of disease risk (Slovic 1987).  This could be leveraging the results for 
women.   
 
Another intriguing finding of the insurance model is that the effects of baseline 
optimism on the demand for insurance were largely nullified for subjects who received 
the cancer-risk information prior to taking the survey.  To further investigate the effect 
of information, we regressed the optimism variables on information and demographic 
controls.  We found that information did not influence baseline optimism significantly, 
but information acted to increase the level of control optimism.  These are interesting 
results that we plan to explore further in future papers.   
 
Past research has found evidence that risk aversion and cognitive ability influence 
demand in some insurance markets [Guiso and Paiella (2005), Barsky et al. (1995), 
Cohen and Siegelman (2010), Einav and Finkelstein (2011)].  We estimated a simple 
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insurance model that included the premium and the risk aversion variable as the only 
covariates, and found that coefficient of the risk aversion variable was positive and 
statistically significant.  Similarly, the coefficient of cognitive ability is positive and 
statistically significant in an insurance model that excludes all variables except the 
measure of cognitive ability and the insurance premium.  This may be a symptom of 
multicollinearity among the variables that is elevating the standard errors of the 
coefficients of risk aversion and cognitive ability when the full range of covariates is 
included.  Thus, we are hesitant to conclude decisively that cognitive ability and risk 
aversion do not play a role in cancer insurance demand.  It could well be that 
measurement error and/or multicollinearity are leading to an overestimate of their 
standard errors in the insurance models.  Nonetheless, risk aversion and cognitive ability 
are not significant predictors of prevention effort even in simple models, and therefore 
the case for any selection arising from these variables in this sample is very weak. 
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VIII.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we report the results of a survey of 474 men and women that analyzes 
willingness to pay for cancer-care insurance, factors that affect the demand for 
insurance, and variables that influence cancer-prevention activities.  In particular, we 
seek to test whether risk misperception leads to selection, controlling for other possible 
sources of selection such as cognitive ability and risk aversion.   
 
We offer evidence that supports Spinnewjn ‘s (2013) hypothesis that selection  may 
occur as a result of  subjective misperceptions about baseline cancer risks and the 
efficacy of health-risk reduction activities.  Our statistical results indicate that the more 
optimistic a male subject is concerning his baseline cancer risk, the lower his willingness 
to pay for cancer insurance.  We do not find evidence of this effect with females, 
however.  We also find that subjects (both male and female) who over-estimate the 
return to preventative behaviors are more likely to invest in preventative effort, thereby 
lowering their cancer risk and expected associated health-care costs.  The pattern of 
insurance, choice, prevention behavior, and risk misperception can lead to adverse or 
advantageous selection, depending on the relative influence of control and baseline 
optimism on behavior.   
 
The models control for other variables, such as risk aversion and cognitive ability that 
have been shown to lead to selection in insurance markets.  We find weak evidence that 
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these variables influence willingness to pay for insurance, but no evidence that they are 
correlated with preventative effort.  Still, these relationships may be present but 
clouded by multicollinearity and/or measurement error problems.  We recommend that 
future studies elicit alternative measures of cognitive ability and risk aversion to further 
examine their influence on demand for insurance and prevention activities.   
 
This is the first empirical study we know of that investigates risk misperception as a 
source of selection.  We believe the results reported here are useful to researchers 
interested in risk communication, risk perception as well as selection in insurance 
markets.  That said, there are limitations to the analysis.  For one, the data is based on a 
hypothetical market so that people never actually purchased or refused the insurance.  
People may well make different choices in a hypothetical market, in the context of a 
survey, than they make when purchasing actual insurance policies. 
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Appendix I:  Notes on Survey Methodology 
 
As described in the Acknowledgements, we received a total of 549 completed survey 
responses.  An additional 42 respondents began, but did not complete, the surveys.  Of 
the completed surveys we received, we rejected 71 (leaving 478), for the following 
reasons: 
- Duplicate Internet Protocol Address or Amazon Mechanical Turk ID:  28 
- Had Cancer:  23 
- Latitude/Longitude Outside United States:  11 
- Completed Survey in Under 5 Minutes:  9 
- Total:  71 
As described in the Overview, we conducted the survey using Qualtrics, and solicited 
respondents through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT).  Surveys were conducted on 
separate dates, between October 2013 and September 2014.  Separate surveys were 
issued for colon, bladder, breast, and prostate cancers, and for each of these, a further 
difference was that half of the surveys contained information booklets at the beginning 
of the survey, and others did not.  Respondents were unaware that the surveys were 
different; the only difference they were able to perceive was whether a survey was 
meant for women or men. 
Each survey was open for several days, and was cut off automatically by AMT when we 
reached the target number of desired respondents.   We rejected surveys that were 
completed in under 5 minutes, reasoning that such surveys were likely not carefully 
read or answered by respondents.  We also rejected surveys that originated from the 
same IP address, or using the same AMT ID, as a previous survey, reasoning that these 
were likely the same respondent, or possibly a household member.  In either case, 
selection bias could be present if we allowed more than one response per IP address or 
AMT ID.  We rejected surveys from those who have had or currently have cancer, 
because the HCRI relative risk factors do not apply to such individuals, and hence any 
measures we could develop for these individuals using the HCRI would be invalid.  
Finally, we rejected survey responses that originate from outside the United States, as 
the HCRI relative risk factors are specific to the U.S. population. 
A possible source of measurement error that could bias results is that due to 
respondents who began, but did not complete the survey.  As noted above, 42 of the 
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591 persons who initiated the survey did not complete it.  The vast majority of these 
quit the survey within the first minute, as measured and recorded by Qualtrics.   
As cited in Gravelle and Lachapelle (2015), procedures for handling missing data, and for 
imputing nonresponse in surveys, is addressed in Allison (2001), Little and Rubin (2002), 
and Rubin (1987).  However, the majority of our incomplete surveys contained no 
responses at all; by design within Qualtrics, we were able to force responses to all 
questions we posed to respondents.  We were left with 549 fully complete surveys, and 
42 surveys that contained little or no data at all.  Therefore, techniques for imputing 
nonresponse were not applicable to the majority of the 42 incomplete surveys. 
We nevertheless should consider the possibility that these aborted surveys may have 
led to measurement error in one or more of our estimations.  We reason that while 
some of these terminated surveys may have been due to internet connection or other 
technical difficulties, which would likely have been uncorrelated with the regressors and 
therefore unlikely to bias results, the majority of these terminated surveys were likely 
due to respondent fatigue, or laziness.  If “laziness” is then correlated with one of our 
regressors, such as age, gender, income, or education level, then this would tend to bias 
our results.  However, as the majority of terminated surveys occurred before 
demographic questions were asked, many in the booklet phase before any questions at 
all had been asked, we have no way of estimating possible correlations for these 
subjects.  With a 7 percent survey abort rate, we do however conclude that any bias in 
our results is likely to have been small. 
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Appendix II:  Derivation of Partial Derivative of Bivariate Normal  
Cumulative Distribution Function 
 
In (15) we reference the partial derivatives of the bivariate normal cumulative 
distribution functions, 
ˆ ˆ;
ˆ
i prev wtp
T
prev
f

(β β )
β
and 
ˆ ˆ;
ˆ
i prev wtp
T
wtp
f

(β β )
β
, which we will develop here.   
From (14) we have: 
   2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ; ; | , , .i prev wtp i prev i wtp prev wtpf     β β X β X β  
From Johnson and Wichern (2007, pg. 151), we have the bivariate normal probability 
density function: 
 
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In the following derivation, we substitute into (II.1) our parameter estimates ˆ ,prev ˆ ,wtp
ˆ , 1
1
ˆˆ ,
n
prev i prevn
i


 X β   and  1
1
ˆˆ .
n
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i


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The bivariate normal probability density function is integrable, leading to the following 
specification for the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function: 
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As stated previously, we will take ˆ prevβ and 
ˆ
wtpβ to be vectors of estimated coefficients of 
the latent bivariate probit indexes.  Without loss of generality, and for clarity’s sake, we 
arbitrarily chose a coefficient in vector ˆ ,prevβ  say 
ˆ ,j  with values for j  between 1  and
p , and then calculate the partial derivative of if  with respect to 
ˆ
j .  Note that 
ˆ
j  is 
stochastic, and as the bivariate normal distribution is both continuous and continuously 
derivable across its domain, we have: 
    ,
,
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The right-hand side of the product in (II.3) is readily derived as 
,
ˆ ˆ
, ( .4)
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
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where ijX is the observation for exogenous variable j  made on subject i . 
We can then apply the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus (Golberg and Cho 2010, 
pg. 11) to the left-hand side of the product in (II.3): 
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Then, rationalizing the exponent in (II.5) we have: 
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Now, changing variables of integration and substituting into (II.6), let  
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Combining results from (II.4) and (II.7) into (II.3), we have: 
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where again for clarity we have substituted: 
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Since ˆ j  was chosen arbitrarily from 
ˆ ,prevβ  we can similarly derive the other partial 
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Now, by symmetry we can repeat steps described above in (II.3) through (II.9) for any 
arbitrary ˆk  in
ˆ ,wtpβ yielding: 
59 
 
 
  , ,1 , 1 2
ˆ ˆ; ˆ
( .10)
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1
i prev wtp prev i wtp iik
wtp i
prev wtpk
f X
II
 
 
  
  
    
   
β β
 
and 
 
  , ,1 , 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ; 1
( .11)
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1
i prev wtp prev i wtp i
wtp i iT
prev wtpwtp
f
II
 
 
  
  
    
   
(β β )
X
β
 
 
Finally, substituting (II.9) and (II.11) into (15), we arrive at 
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for which values can readily be calculated given observation vector ,iX  and estimates 
previously derived for ˆ ˆ, ,prev prev   and ˆ;  the resulting vector iC  can then be 
substituted into (18) to yield a consistent estimate for 
11,
2ˆ .
ip
  
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Appendix III:  Copy of Qualtrics Survey 
 
In the following twenty pages we show a copy of the survey used for men, for colon 
cancer.  Similar surveys were used for women for colon cancer, and for both women and 
men for the other three cancers, as appropriate.  Note that approximately half of survey 
respondents were presented with information on one of the three cancers, and the 
other half were not. 
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Economic Research Seminar, UNLV (Grades:  A, A) 
Macroeconomics (Spring 2015) 
 
 
GRADUATE-LEVEL MATHEMATICS COURSEWORK 
 
Advanced Matrix Theory & Applications, UNLV (Grade:  A) 
Introduction to Real Analysis, UNLV (Grade:  A) 
Introduction to Math Statistics, UNLV (Grade:  A) 
 
 
SALIENT UNDERGRADUATE MATHEMATICS COURSEWORK 
 
Introduction to Complex Analysis, Brigham Young University (Grade:  A-) 
Introduction to Probability and Statistics, MIT (Grade:  A) 
 
 
ACADEMIC PAPER 
 
Mary Riddel and David Hales, “Risk Misperceptions and Selection in Insurance Markets:  
An Application to Demand for Cancer Insurance,” presented at the March 2014 Risk, 
Perception, and Response Conference at the Harvard School of Public Health, and at the 
December 2014 Behavioral Insurance Workshop at Ludwig-Maximilians University of 
Munich.  This paper has been submitted for publication consideration. 
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TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
 
Teaching Assistant, Public Finance, UNLV (Fall 2013) 
Supplemental Instructor, Intermediate Microeconomics, UNLV (Spring 2014) 
Teaching Assistant, Business Economics, UNLV (Fall 2014) 
 
 
PRINCIPAL EMPLOYMENT 
 
10/2011 –  7/2015 Board Chairman and CEO, Global Fidelity Corp.  
6/2008 – 9/2011 Board Member and CFO, Global Fidelity Corp. 
4/2007 – 5/2008 Strategist, Multi-National Force-Iraq, U.S. Air Force. 
2/2006 – 4/2007 Deputy Director of Staff, Offutt Air Force Base, U.S. Air Force. 
8/2005 – 1/2006 Dep Squadron Commander, Bagram, Afghanistan, U.S. Air Force. 
10/2003 – 7/2005 Flight & Squadron Comndr, Offutt Air Force Base, U.S. Air Force. 
10/2000 – 10/2003 Northeast Asia Specialist, HQ Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Air Force. 
7/1994 – 9/2000 (other assignments as an officer in the U.S. Air Force) 
 
 
OTHER APPOINTMENTS 
 
9/2009 –    Managing Director, Ohana Matters Foundation  
10/2009 –   Steering Committee Member, U.S. Senator Brian Schatz (D-HI) 
11/2013 –   Military Affairs Advisor, Mayor John Lee, North Las Vegas 
12/2008 –  Reserve Officer (Lieutenant Colonel), U.S. Air Force Reserves 
4/2004 – 7/2015 Board Member, Pipeline Micro, Inc. 
10/2013 – 10/2014 Advisory Board Member, College of Southern Nevada 
4/2009 – 12/2010 Board Member, Hawaii Science and Technology Council 
11/2008 – 6/2010 Operations Committee Member, Hawaii Angels Investor Group 
 
